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Firms’ investment under financing constraints 
A euro area investigation 
 
Rozália Pál - Roman Kozhan 
Abstract 
In this paper we describe a theoretical model of optimal investment of various types of 
financially constrained firms. We show that the resulting relationship between internal funds 
and investment is non-monotonic. In particular, the magnitude of the cash flow sensitivity of 
the investment is lower for firms with credit rationing compared to firms that are able to 
obtain short-term external financing. The inverse relationship is driven by the leverage 
multiplier effect. A positive cash flow shock increases the short-term borrowing capacity of 
the firm, which in turn has a positive effect on investment and firm’s growth. Moreover, the 
leverage multiplier effect is the highest for firms relying on short-term credits and it is lower 
for firms that are able to obtain long-term financing. Analysing a large euro area data set we 
find strong empirical support for our theoretical predictions. The results also help to explain 
some contradictory findings in the financing constraints literature. 
JEL classification: D92, G3, G32 
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Az eurozóna vállalati beruházásai finanszírozási korlátok 
mellett 
 
Pál Rozália — Roman Kozhan 
Összefoglaló 
A dolgozatban eltérő finanszírozási korlátú vállalatok optimális beruházásának elméleti 
modelljét mutatjuk be. Megmutatjuk, hogy a belső p é n z ü g y i  f o r r á s o k  é s  b e r u h á z á s  
kapcsolatára adódó összefüggés nem monoton. A hitel-korlátos vállalatoknál a beruházások 
kevésbé érzékenyek a pénzforgalomra, mint azoknál a cégeknél, amelyek hozzáférnek rövid-
távú külső finanszírozáshoz. Az inverz összefüggést a tőkeáttételi multiplikátor hatás 
határozza meg. Egy pozitív pénzforgalmi sokk növeli a cég rövid-távú hitelfelvételi korlátját, 
ami pozitívan hat a vállalat növekedésére. Továbbá a tőkeáttételi multiplikátor hatás a rövid-
távú hitelekre szoruló cégeknél a legmagasabb, és alacsonyabb azoknál, amelyek képesek 
hosszú-távú hitelhez jutni. Egy az eurozóna vállalatait lefedő nagyméretű adatbázist 
felhasználó empirikus elemzés eredményei nagyon pontosan egybeesnek az elméleti 
következtetésekkel. Ezek az eredmények hozzájárulnak a finanszírozási korlátok irodalma 
ellentmondásos következtetéseinek jobb értelmezéséhez. 
 
Tárgyszavak: 
Finanszírozási korlátok, növekedés, beruházás, pénzforgalom érzékenység. 
 
4 INTRODUCTION 
Understanding the firms’ investment decisions under imperfect market conditions is one of 
the central issues of the financial economics. Studying firm’s investment in such 
environment can provide insight into the dynamics of its growth as a function of internal and 
external financial sources. Fazzari et al. (1988) argue that in the presence of financing 
constraints the firms’ investment varies not only with the availability of the profitable 
investment projects, but also with the internal funds. Consequently, the severity of the 
financing constraints is proposed to be measured by the magnitude of the cash flow 
sensitivity of investment.  
However, there is debate on the interpretation of the sensitivity in the light of the 
financing constraints. Different conclusions are drawn mostly because of the different ways 
of a-priori classification in financially constrained and unconstrained groups. Fazzari et al. 
(1988) consider firms a-priori as constrained if they pay low dividend payout ratio, and they 
interpret the estimated significant cash flow sensitivity of this group of firms as an evidence 
of financing constraints. The lower sensitivity is taken as an evidence of the less severe 
financing conditions.1 Kaplan and Zingales (1997) define as financially constrained those 
firms that are in violation of debt convenants, have been cut out of their usual source of 
credit, are negotiating debt payments, or declare that they are forced to reduce investments 
because of liquidity problems. Their classification is based on the managers’ report on 
operations, capital resources and liquidity (qualitative information) and financial statements 
and notes (quantitative information). Contrary to previous results, they document the 
highest sensitivity for least constrained firms. In a recent study, Moyen (2004) shows, that 
both results can be replicated with the help of a simulated sample just by changing the a-
priori classification, however not all of these a-priori classifications is able to group firms 
based on their true financing conditions.  
In this paper we propose an alternative perspective to investigate the relationship 
between financing conditions and the sensitivity measure. First, we argue that in the real 
world it is hard to identify a group of firms in the absence of the financing constraints. Just 
considering the external relative to the internal costs of financing, we could hardly find any 
unconstrained firm (Kaplan and Zingales (1997)). Consequently, we focus on the severity of 
the constraints instead of its absence or presence. We model the firms’ cash flow sensitivity 
of total investment with respect to the reliance on the external financial market. Further on, 
                                                        
1 Supporting results with alternative classifications are summarised in the literature overview presented by 
Schiantarelli (1995) and Hubbard (1998). 
  
we differentiate firms relying mostly on short-term credits from those that are able to access 
external long-term sources assuming that long-term debt is more preferable for investments.  
Some firms forgo investment rather than access capital markets. Consequently the firm 
will under-invest relative to its first best level. The reason behind can be diverse, i.e. the firm 
decides not to take the credit because of the high cost, managerial agency problem, or not 
wishing to provide private information on their projects to the financing institutions. Firm’s 
can face the credit rationing resulting from asymmetric information, moral hazard, adverse 
selection, costly state verification or low level of tangible assets2. Consequently, we provide a 
special attention to such group of firms that rely exclusively on their internal sources, 
considering them under the worst financing conditions.  
Firms with a financing need (lower cash flow than investment value) access external 
financing sources whenever it is possible in order to precede their investment projects. 
However the variability in internal sources, especially a negative shock, increases not only 
the likelihood that a firm will need external sources but its cost as well and at the same time 
it also decreases the likelihood to obtain it (see Minton and Schrand (1999)). In such case 
both borrowing and investment became endogenous. An increase in cash flow results in a 
higher borrowing capacity, which in turn allows for higher investment and growth (see also 
Carpenter and Petersen (2002) and Almeida and Campello (2006)). Consequently, we expect 
a higher sensitivity of levered firms compared to those relying exclusively on internal 
sources. Moreover, we argue that the leverage multiplier effect associated with the 
endogenous change in external credit capacity following a cash flow shock is the highest for 
those constrained firms which need to negotiate each year their external sources. We assume 
that firms that are able to obtain longer term borrowings are the least constrained or 
unconstrained firms (despite of some market imperfections all of their positive net value 
projects can be financed) and a lower cash flow sensitivity is expected compared to those that 
are financed by short-term borrowings. Their borrowing capacity is assumed to be 
determined by factors less related to the current liquidity, such as longer-term credit history, 
stock market performance, bank-firm relationship, size, etc. In such case the multiplier effect 
is reduced or completely disappears. Still, the external funds could be insufficient for all of 
their positive net value projects and each additional cash flow would have a positive direct 
effect on the investment and growth. In the optimal case, when internal and external funds 
are sufficient for all of their investment projects, investment should not vary with the 
                                                        
2 For theoretical discussion see Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Williamson (1986), Bester (1985), Jaffee and Russell 





internal funds. Taking into consideration both direct and indirect effects, the sensitivity is 
expected to be the lowest for this group of firms. 
We test the predictions of the theoretical model using a euro-area sample. Borrowings 
from financial institutions play a special role in the European financial system. First, 
contrary to the American system, the European financial system is more bank than market 
oriented3. Private firms do not have the option to increase their capital through new issue of 
shares (around 70% of our sample) and those listed on the market rely also on the credits 
obtained from financial institutions as the priori source4. Second, in line with the pecking 
order theory of Myers (1984) and Myers and Majful (1984), only firms, that are not able to 
increase their leverage, issue shares. Our firm classification relies on quantitative 
information taken from balance sheets and profits and loss statements, allowing the 
reclassification of firms’ financial status each period. However the final analysis is in a 
dynamic framework and the firms’ status in the whole period is determined conditional on 
its yearly changes. We use an error correction model with system GMM estimations 
(Arellano and Bond (1991), Blundell and Bond (1998)). 
We find strong empirical support for our predictions. For firms with no access to external 
financing sources an additional euro of internal finance results in less than a euro total 
investment in fixed and non-cash current assets. For partially constrained firms, that have 
access to external financial market but with certain binding conditions in the sense that they 
are able to obtain only short-term credit, an additional euro generates slightly more than an 
additional one euro caused by the leverage multiplier effect. And finally, firms with available 
long-term borrowings face lower investment sensitivity on internal financing.  
Considering the classifications of the previous literature, our first group of firms that 
relies exclusively on internal finance have similar characteristics to those defined as 
constrained by the KZ index, Moyen’s constrained model and Cleary’s index (see Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997), Moyen (2003) and Cleary (1999)).  Our results are similar to the findings of 
these studies, i.e. firms relying on internal sources (identified as constrained) face a lower 
sensitivity than those that are able to borrow. The lower sensitivity of long-term borrowing 
firms compared to the short-term borrowing firms is more in line with the Fazzari et al. 
(1988) findings, i.e firms facing higher asymmetric information problems and consequently 
not able to satisfy the conditions for long-term borrowing, have higher cash flow sensitivity. 
Hence, we present evidence for the two contradictory predictions of the literature, showing 
that they are more complementary.  
                                                        
3 In 2004, bank loans represented around 90% of the total debt flows to non-financial corporations in the euro 
area. The stock market capitalization at the end of 2003 in Euro Area was 73.4%, which is significantly lower 
than the US capitalization of 129.6% of GDP (source: World Federation of Exchanges). 
4 For a more detailed description of the European financial system see Ehrmann et al (2001) and Hartmann et 
al. (2003). 
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  The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the related literature of 
non-monotonic behaviour of investment-cash flow sensitivity. In Section 3 the theoretical 
model is presented. Section 4 describes the data and sample selection. In Section 5 the 
empirical test of the theoretical model’s predictions is described. Main conclusions are 
summarised in the final section. 
 
1.  Related literature 
On the theoretical basis there is no sufficient condition for monotonicity in the cash flow 
sensitivity with respect to firms financing conditions. A higher sensitivity of corporate 
investment to cash flow is not sufficient evidence for more severe financing constraints (see 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000)). Couple of recent papers present theoretical models 
supporting the non-monotonous sensitivity, however there is less clear way about its pattern, 
especially on the empirical level.  
Cleary, Povel and Raith (2003) present a non-monotonic relationship between 
investment and cash flow. They show that firms with negative cash flow or zero dividends 
have the lowest sensitivity and it is the highest for firms with moderate cash flow or 
dividend. For the firms with the highest cash flow or dividend, which they considered as 
unconstrained, a lower sensitivity is estimated. Boyle and Guthrie (2003) present a dynamic 
model of investment distorted by costly external financing. They look at the relationship of 
investment timing and financing constraints showing that financing constraints can not only 
discourage investment, but also accelerate it, resulting in sub-optimal early investments. 
More importantly, an increase in cash has a smaller positive effect on the investment for 
constrained firms with low-cash than it does for constrained firms with high-cash. Dasgupta 
and Sengupta (2002) investigate with the help of a multi-period version of a standard moral 
hazard model the case when the firms have the option to allocate their liquidity inter-
temporally. Their results differ from the previous two studies. They argue that the 
responsiveness of investment to changes in liquidity is the highest for low liquidity firms, the 
least for intermediate liquidity firms and intermediate for the high liquidity firms. However, 
Moyen (2003) shows that the value of cash flow, just as the dividend payout ratio used for a-
priori classification is not appropriate to distinguish firms facing different financing 
conditions. 
Moyen (2003) compares the dynamic model of unconstrained relative to constrained 
firm. The categories of constrained-unconstrained firms are defined based on their access to 
external financial markets where only unconstrained firms can issue debt. They predict a 
higher investment cash-flow sensitivity of unconstrained firm. They explain the higher 
sensitivity by the effect of debt financing on investment that is not taken into account by the 
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regression specification. Carpenter and Petersen (2002) provide also a theoretical model for 
the leverage multiplier effect. They show that the leverage effect occurs when firms’ access to 
debt depends on the collateral and each additional dollar of internal finance should generate 
slightly more than one additional dollar of growth. Similar to this explanation, Almeida and 
Campello (2006) develop a theory explaining that sensitivities will decrease with financial 
constraints, so long as firms are not entirely unconstrained. They explain the decreasing 
sensitivity by the cash flow borrowing capacity. They show that investment-cash flow 
sensitivities are increasing in the degree of tangibility of constrained firms’ assets and for 
entirely unconstrained firms the investment-cash flow sensitivities drop to zero. This implies 
that the relationship between capital spending and cash flows is non-monotonic.  
Our results are in line with the Carpenter and Petersen (2002) and Almeida and 
Campello (2006) theoretical model predictions. Since Almeida and Campello (2006) show 
that the multiplier effect is increasing with project’s tangibility, we show that such multiplier 
effect depends on the type of borrowing. We contribute to the literature of non-monotonic 
sensitivity, by differentiating the short versus long-term borrowing firms. The endogenous 
multiplier effect increases the sensitivity of short-term borrowing firms relative to those that 
rely exclusively on internal financial sources. However, for those firms that are able to get 
long-term financing, the borrowing capacity is less dependent on the current cash flow 
shocks, but rather on the “long-term” firm characteristics, like credit history, size, bank-firm 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  e t c .  I n  t h i s  c a s e  t h e  i n d i r e c t  e f f e c t  o f  c a s h  f l o w  o n  i n v e s t m e n t s  i s  l e s s  
significant or even disappears. In addition, the direct effect of cash flow is expected to be less 
significant, since firms are able to make the long-term investment plans relying on long-term 
borrowings, weakening the reliance of investment and growth on internal financing. The 
non-monotonic relationship of the theoretical literature relies partially on the existence of 
the totally unconstrained firms. Contrary to simulated sample, where unconstrained firms by 
definition have zero sensitivity, in real world none of the firms operate in perfect market 
conditions. The non-monotonic relationship derived in this paper is independent of the 
presence of the totally unconstrained firms.  
 
THEORETICAL MODEL 
In order to discuss the investment-cash flow sensitivity in the light of financial constraints let 
us define several tipes of constrained firms. As it was already mentioned before, it is quite 
difficult to find in the real world a group of totally unconstrained firms. It looks more reliable 
to determine the degree of the financing constraints based on the accessibility to different 
types of external financial sources. A firm is assumed to be absolutely constrained if it cannot 
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issue any debts and its internal sources are not enough to cover the optimal investment value 
(a firm with higher sources than the optimal investment is unconstrained). We consider a 
firm to be partially constrained if it has no possibility to issue long-term debts but can rely 
on the short-term credits. And least constrained firms are those able to issue debts with 
long-term maturity. The long-term borrowings is always preferable relative to short-term 
borrowings for the financing a long term projects. 
We consider the model with a firm which is going to finance a long-term project (two 
periods in this context). The project’s investment starts at time 0 and at the end the second 
period the firm collects the revenues , where the production function   is 
twice differentiable strictly concave (i.e.  ) and increasing ( ).There are two 
alternative sources of financing: internally, using the cash flow (CF) and externally, 
borrowing funds (D) from creditors. We also assume that the firm cannot invest into the 
project the whole amount of the cash flow. For liquidity reasons it saves
) ( 0 I F
F
+ + → R R F :
0
' ' < 0
' > F
CF α , where  1 < α , 
under the form of cash or highly liquid assets.  
Let us consider now the investment policies of the unconstrained and our three types of 
constrained firms. 
Unconstrained firms with sufficient internal sources: The optimal investment 
can be calculated as the solution of the profit maximization problem.  
max, ) ( 0 0 → − I I F   CF I ) 1 ( 0 α − ≤ . 








CF , where 
 is the first-best investment – the solution of the unconstrained maximization 
problem  . In this case we implicitly suppose that the firm can issue debts 
but it does not do so because it has enough internal sources to finance its project. The cash 
flow sensitivity of the investment under no financing constraints is: 
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I. Absolutely constrained firms: Internal sources are not sufficient, i.e. its cash flow 
available for investment is less than the first best investment, ( . This group of 
firms cannot issue any debts. The profit function 
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Its solution for the amount of investment is:  , and the investment-cash 
flow sensitivity is: 
CF I
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CF , can be 
compensated by the issue of short-term debts. Firms financed by short-term debts need to 
renegotiate its credit contracts at time 1 or to find another credit in order to pay the financial 
obligations. We assume that the negotiation costs are fixed and smaller than the saved 
amount of cash,  CF α , so these reserves can be used at time 1 for contract renegotiation.  
W e  a s s u m e  t h a t  b o r r o w i n g  c a p a c i t y  i s  a  f u n c tion of the project tangibility (see also 
Carpenter and Petersen (2002) and Almeida and Campalo (2006)). The project can be 
liquidated at time 1 and its liquidation value is equal to  , with  0 qI 1 < q . Due to the risk of the 
project’s default the bank is not going to lend more than the liquidation value of the project 
plus the cash savings of the firm. In this case the firm is faced with a debt constraint of the 
form:  0 qI CF D + ≤α . We assume that the maximum total financing of the short-term firm 
 and the profit function 
*




* I I = , the firm is assumed to have an infinitely elastic borrowing and consequently 
enter the category of least constrained firms (III). The maximization problem of the partially 
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III. Least constrained firms: Firms with available long-term debts do not face the 
problem of renegotiation risk and do not pay the fixed costs of the credit contract at time 1. 
For this type of firms the borrowing capacity is assumed to be less dependent on the project 
tangibility, but rather on other characteristics, like size, firms’ tangibility, credit history, 
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Thus, the least constrained firm solves the maximization problem:  
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the function   lies within the constraint interval ( 0 0) ( I I F − )) ( ) 1 ( , 0 CF B CF + −α  and 
 if ( . Hence, the optimal investment-cash 
flow sensitivity of the least constrained firms firm can be described as:  
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In summary we can conclude that  . . . c least c partially c absolutely Sens Sens Sens > < , i.e. the 
partially constrained firms are expected to have always the highest sensitivity. Firms relying 
on the long-term debts are expected to have the lowest sensitivity, however it depends on the 
percentage of firms that are able to finance all of their positive net value projects with the 
help of external financing. Our model shows a non-monotonic investment-cash flow 
sensitivity with respect to financing constraints even in the case when all firms faces some 
under-financing problem (the direct effect of cash flow on investment is always present for 




SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION  
We use a comprehensive database of euro area firms collected from the AMADEUS database 
of Bureau van Dijk. Amadeus contains financial information on about 2.6 millions private 
and publicly owned firms across euro area countries. Data is created by collecting 
standardised data received from vendors of each European country. In addition to financial 
8  
information, the 4-digit NACE code, which is the European standard of industry 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ,  i s  a l s o  g i v e n .  W e  s e l e c t  f o r our study only those firms that provide the 
consolidated balance sheets resulting in a sample of about 26,000 firms. The consolidated 
annual accounts are selected because these are considered to be the most suitable format for 
providing information about the financial situation of the parent company since the true 
financial boundaries of firms are at group level and not at individual plants. It takes in 
consideration the financial interest and the net assets owned by the parent in subsidiaries 
that will contribute to future earnings and dividends. Additionally, the consolidated accounts 
make our study more comparable across the results of the previous literature. 
The time period covered is 1990-2004, however we exclude the first four years because of 
the poor coverage and an additional year is lost by constructing the variables of interest as 
the first difference of the balance sheet items. We exclude firms operating in financial 
services industries (Nace code 65 and 66) because their financial ratios are not comparable 
to those of non-financial companies. In addition, we drop several country-specific industries, 
like the Agriculture (Nace code 1), Forestry (Nace code 2), Fishing (Nace code 5) and Mining 
(Nace code 10-14) industry sectors. Finally, we drop the government/public sector, 
Education, Health and social sector, Activities of organizations, private households and 
extra-territorial organizations, and firms that cannot be classified (NACE codes 75, 80, 85, 
91, 92, 95 and 99). The selected sample consists of 15,145 firms with 69,136 observations. 
We apply several quality checks on the data. Only those firms are selected that provide 
information on the total assets and sales. The sample size is further reduced after checking 
the reported balance-sheet items of selected firms to be positive and that the sum of the 
subcategories of a balance-sheet item not to differ more than 5% from the reported value of 
the item. Finally, we exclude firms that are inactive. We apply a 1% trimming of the variables 
of main interest: logarithm of total assets, total assets growth, sales growth, total investment, 
c a s h  f l o w  t o  b e g i n n i n g  o f  p e r i o d  t o t a l  a s s e t s  a n d  s h o r t / l o n g  t e r m  b o r r o w i n g s  t o  t h e  
beginning of year total assets. We retain only those firms that report data for, at least, three 
consecutive years. The main sample consists of 5,131 firms with 31,499 observations (for a 
detailed sample selection see the appendix). 
Amadeus is especially useful because of its large coverage of both public and private 
firms (80% of total sample), however it faces some limitations. The coverage varies across 
euro area countries reflecting the peculiarities of European accounting legislation and its 
heterogeneity across countries. For example, Greece firms do not provide consolidated items 
and data on Irish firms were filtered out by the quality controls due to the low coverage. 
Austrian and Luxembourgian firms have a very low coverage. The Netherlands and Finland 
are over-represented due to statutory reporting requirements of the consolidated statements. 
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Countries such as France, Italy and Spain are well covered by the sample (for a detailed 
cross-country coverage of the sample see the appendix). 
 
FIRMS’ CLASSIFICATION 
While there is a consensus to consider financially constrained firms those that face 
difficulties in obtaining external finance, there is no clear way how to identify these firms a-
priori and the posterior sensitivity measures are influenced by the alternative a-priori 
classification. Just as Kaplan and Zingales (1997) argue, the definition of financial 
constraints is based on the cost of internal and external financing is the most precise one but 
also the broadest as well. Based on this definition almost all firms can be classified as 
constrained, just considering the transaction costs of external finance. However there is a 
significant difference among firms with respect to their accessibility to external financing, 
which in turn affects their corporate investment policy and growth. Our classification does 
not measure the internal relative to external costs but it captures cross-sectional differences 
in financing conditions defined as the availability of the external financial sources. Since all 
firms face the imperfect market conditions on some degree we propose a new classification 
instead of the traditional constrained-unconstrained classification. We identify three 
different types of firms: I.) firms relying mostly on internal financial sources noted as 
absolutely constrained firms, II.) firms relying on short-term external sources with maturity 
less than one year, noted as partially constrained, and III.) firms relying on external financial 
sources in form of long-term borrowings with maturity above one year, considered as the 
least constrained firms. We classify firm-years in the first category, only when there is a sign 
of constraints, i.e. despite of the financing needs (higher investment value than current cash 
flow) firms cannot get external sources and they need to use the cash savings from the 
previous periods or to liquidate its assets.  We assume that firms with long-term projects 
would always prefer long-term instead of short-term borrowings because of the additional 
renegotiation costs and renegotiation risk of the short-term financing. Moreover, firms with 
higher borrowing costs tend to use less external finance than firms under favourable 
condition. The long-term borrowing firms obtain the credits under better conditions, just if 
we consider the fixed cost of credit renegotiation. We are not able to determine, whether 
firms with long-term borrowings are able to finance all of their positive net value projects but 
we can expect to be closer to the optimal investments than firms belonging to the other two 
groups and we can consider them the least constrained firms. Table 1 summarizes the 
criteria used in the classification and the cross-groups firm-years distribution. 
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[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
After having classified each observation we apply a dynamic view of constraints. For this, 
we look at the characteristics to be present for minimum of three consecutive years and in 
the most of the available years of the given company (total number of years divided by two 
p l u s  o n e ) .  I n  o r d e r  t o  c l a s s i f y  a  f i r m  a s  a b s o l u t e l y  c o n s t r a i n e d ,  m i n i m u m  o f  t h r e e  
consecutive years should use only internal financial sources despite of the financing need or 
they liquidate their assets. Our sample is an unbalanced sample of firms and since 3 years of 
constrained years could be followed by 7 years of unconstrained years, for the firm 
classification we give the additional condition that the majority of its firm-years should be 
absolutely constrained. This means that the number of constrained years should be more 
than the total number of available years of the given firm divided by two (in case of 
maximum available of 10 years, in a minimum of 6 years the firm should be absolutely 
constrained). The firm is considered as partially constrained, if minimum of three 
consecutive years and in majority of its available years was categorised as partially or 
absolutely constrained. The least constrained firms are those that are not included in the 
previous two categories and consequently for such firms the financial constraints do not 
persist for more than half of the available years and less than 3 consecutive years. The final 
outcome of the classification is presented in Table 2 and the regression analyses are based on 
this dynamic firm classification. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
EMPIRICAL TEST 
To gain some first insight into the firms’ characteristics and their financing condition, key 
characteristics of firms of the three groups are reported in Table 3. Differences in mean 
values of the variables among the firm-groups are tested based on the t statistic.  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
The first variable presented in Table 3 indicates that firms that rely more intensively on 
external financial sources are in general larger. The growth of total assets (2nd variable) is 
significantly higher for the firms with financial debt. Less risky firms get better financing, 
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thus have less impediment in their growth. This relationship is important with respect to one 
of the main critics addressed to the sensitivity measure. Previous studies emphasize that the 
magnitude of the sensitivities, which should measure the presence of financing constrained 
is actually reflecting future investment opportunities and it is higher for growing firms (see 
Ericson and Whited (2000), Alti (2003), Bond et al. (2004)). Thus the cash flow sensitivity 
could reflect the future investment opportunity, not efficiently captured by other proxies like 
Tobins’ Q or sales growth. If the hidden investment opportunities would rule the investment-
cash flow sensitivity of our sample, we should estimate a monotonic increase in sensitivity 
from absolutely to least constrained firms. If there is any distortion caused by future 
investment opportunity, this would result in a higher increase of sensitivity of least 
constrained firms. A higher growth of less constrained firms is documented also by Cleary 
(1999) and Whited and Wu (2004). They classify firms based on the dividend cuts and an 
index measuring the shadow cost associated with raising new equity (the cost of external 
finance relative to internal finance), respectively.  
The significantly higher sales growth (3rt variable) of less constrained firms could be 
specific for the euro area firms. The euro area of the given period is characterised by a 
progress towards integration of financial system, not only in the area of money markets but 
also in bond markets, equity markets and banking. Related policy initiatives provide the 
opportunity for both new- and well-established firms to new directions of development.5 
This means that possible investment projects are above the internal financial sources and 
any additional external financing is able to increase their productivity and sales. Mizen and 
Vermeulen (2005) suggest using sales growth as a-priori classification criteria for some 
European firms, since the high sales’ growth could be an indicator of financial health and 
future profitability that opens up access to external finance. 
The lower cash flows (4th variable) of absolutely constrained firms confirm our 
assumption that the negative or zero borrowings are caused by the difficulties in obtaining 
external sources and not the excess cash flow. The yearly changes in the amount of short- 
and long-term credits (5th and 6th  variables) are the proxies of the new external sources used 
as a classification criteria and the mean values reflect the outcome of the firms’ classification. 
More importantly, the leverage (7th variable) is higher for less constrained firms, indicating 
that firms do not rely on external financial sources in general, and not only in the analysed 
sample period. The lower leverage of the more constrained firms is in line with the findings 
of Faulkender and Petersen (2003). They argue that the availability of incremental capital 
depends on the risk of the firm’s cash flows and characteristics of the firm. Consequently, 
                                                        




firms with barriers to some external sources are under-levered. The unconstrained firms 
simulated by Moyen (2004) take on also more debt than constrained firms since they can 
respond to income shocks by varying their debt level. 
Based on the leverage (7th variable) and the proxy for the cost of credits (8th variable) we 
find that less constrained firms despite of the higher leverage face lower financing costs. The 
bankruptcy cost of leverage suggests a positive relationship, in the sense that higher leverage 
increases the bankruptcy risk and the higher risk should be compensated by higher interest. 
However, reliable, less risky firms should be able to increase their leverage with lower costs. 
Our data suggest that on the one hand, firms with long-term borrowing are less risky firms 
and consequently they are able to increase their leverage with lower cost. On the other hand, 
firms with short-term borrowings and relying mostly on their internal sources (absolutely 
constrained) are under-levered. Absolutely constrained firms pay the highest cost for the 
credit obtained prior the period under consideration and this could likely be the reason why 
they do not take any further credit obligations. 
The principal specification that we use to test the prediction of the investment-cash flow 
sensitivity of the selected three types of firms is an error correction model and it is as follows: 
 
[]
it country l industry k year j















ε δ δ δ
δ δ δ δ δ
+ + +














, log 8 . 0 (log log
   (1), 
 
where the dependent variable is the total investment of the firm   at time  i t, measured as 
the change in fixed and non-cash current assets plus depreciation divided by the beginning 
of period total assets. Total investment includes besides the fixed investments the 
investment in current assets. Hence, the sensitivity is not affected by the temporary 
fluctuations of the investments through the draw down of working capital (see Carpenter and 
Petersen (2002)). CF  denotes the current cash flow calculated as the profit for the period 
(profit after tax plus extraordinary profit)  plus depreciation and 
t i,
t Sales , log i ∆  is the first 
difference of the logarithm of sales, the proxy for firms’ investment opportunities. The 
regression is controlled for time-, industry- and country- effects by inclusion of the 
corresponding dummy variables,  , , and  respectively and  year D industry D country D t i, ε  is a random 
disturbance. Since we focus on both public and private firms (for which the market value is 
not available), the expected profitability is controlled, instead of the Tobin’s Q, by current 
sales growth, specific to the error correction mod e l s  u s e d  b y  p r e v i ou s  l i t e r a t u r e  ( s e e  f o r  
instance Bond et al. (2004), Fuss and Vermuelen (2004)). The sales growth, just as the cash 
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flow - relative to the Tobin’s Q - can capture relatively more new information obtained within 
the year about the running projects of the firm based on which the manager decides about 
the new investment and revise the target capital stock accordingly (for theoretical model see 
Alti (2003)). Estimating the dynamic structure of the growth, the lag value of the dependent 
variable is also used as an explanatory variable. In addition, the model includes the error 
correction term, based on the estimated long-term relationship among sales and non-cash 
total assets. 
Table 4 presents the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values 
of the variables used for the regression. The median firm has a yearly investment 
representing 10% of the beginning of year total assets, which drops to 5% for absolutely 
constrained firms. The median firm has a cash flow of 9% of the beginning of period total 
assets and a sales growth of 6%. The annual growth of net working capital counts on average 
1.2% of the total assets. Mean and median values do not differ significantly and the 
minimum and maximum values suggest that none of the coefficient estimates of the 
regressions can be influenced by the presence of outliers.  
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Based on the theoretical model, the quantitative predictions of the cash flow sensitivity of 
absolutely constrained firms is less than one. The only source of financing is represented by 
cash flow; however a part of it is reoriented to precautionary cash savings or credit 
repayments. For partially constrained firms the sensitivity is expected to be slightly higher 
than one resulting from the leverage multiplier effect. And finally, for the least constrained 
firms a lower cash flow coefficient is expected, caused by the favourable financing contract 
less dependent on current cash flow shocks (indirect effect) and by the possibility that all 
long-term investment projects of the firm are covered by the available financial sources 
(direct effect).  
In Table 5 the regression results of the two-step system GMM estimates are presented. 
The t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Firm-specific effects are first removed by 
calculating the first differences specific to the GMM estimation. The third lagged values of 
endogenous variables are valid instruments since there is no serial correlation in the time-
varying component of the error terms of the equation. This condition is met, since the test 
for serial correlation in the first difference residuals is rejected based on the test for second-
order autocorrelation (the first-order autocorrelation is expected due to model specification). 
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The validity of the used instruments is also accepted based on the Hansen test of over-
identifying restrictions.  
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
In each of the three samples the cash flow coefficient is statistically significant and it 
strongly supports the quantitative predictions of the model. The point estimate for cash flow 
in the case of absolutely constrained firms is 0.96. For the partially constrained firms the 
cash flow coefficients of 1.15 is consistent with the presence of the leverage multiplier effect. 
And for the least constrained firms the cash flow coefficient is again lower, with the point 
estimates of 0.79.6 This lower coefficient is consistent with the models’ prediction that the 
better credit contracts should reduce the investment dependence on internal finance.  
The coefficient of the sales growth is highly significant for least constrained firms and 
significant under 5% confidence level for the partially and absolutely constrained firms. The 
negative coefficient of the lagged dependent variable, however not statistically significant, 
suggests a mean-reversion of the investment rate. The error correction terms are negative as 
expected, however not statistically significant.  
As a robustness test we use an alternative specification for the error correction term and 
re-estimate the equation 1. The error correction term ( ) is the first lagged 
estimated residuals of the equation:  
term Correction Er _ .
t i i t i t i Sales TA , , , log log ε γ β α + + + =        ( 2 ) ,    
where   and   refer to the logarithm of total assets and sales.  t i TA , log t i Sales , log i γ  and  t i, ε  
represent the firm fixed effects and a random disturbance, respectively. Results are 
presented in Table 6. The cash flow sensitivity of investment has the same pattern as in the 
case of previous estimation, with higher coefficient for partially constrained firms of 1.34. 
The coefficient of absolutely and least constrained firms is about 0.95. The coefficients of the 
error correction terms is higher, given that the value of the estimated residual is lower than 
the assets-sales difference, however statistically still not significant. We can conclude that 
using alternative error correction specification our main results of the cash flow sensitivity is 
not affected. 
 
                                                        
6 The magnitude of the sensitivity is higher than those presented in most of the financing constraints literature. 
This is simply caused by the fact that our dependent variable is the investment in total assets instead of the 
investment in fixed assets. The magnitude of the coefficient is more comparable with the results presented by 
Carpenter and Petersen (2002), using the firm’s growth as a dependent variable. 
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[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we develop a theoretical model that makes quantitative predictions about the 
magnitude of the cash flow-investment sensitivity in the light of financing constraints. 
Relying on a sample of more than 5,000 euro area firms we document a non-monotonic 
investment-cash flow sensitivity, which strongly supports the model’s predictions. The 
explanation for the higher sensitivity of partially constrained firms relative to the absolutely 
constrained is twofold. First, only a part of internal sources is invested, since there is a need 
of precautionary cash savings for liquidity reasons. Second, investments increase the 
borrowing capacity of the firm, so the amount of credits depends also on cash flow shocks. 
Through this indirect leverage effect, an additional dollar of internal finance will generate 
slightly more than an additional dollar of total investment. These findings are in line with the 
amplification effect of Almeida and Campello (2006) and the leverage effect presented by 
Carpenter and Petersen (2002) and Moyen (2004).  
Moreover, we identify a group of least constrained firms among the firms relying on 
external financial market, for which the sensitivity is lower than those with less favourable 
credit contracts (only short-term borrowings are available). Firms are defined as least 
constrained if they are able to borrow long-term without requiring the perfect market 
conditions. We find evidence that the favourable financing contracts are less dependent on 
current cash flow shocks (indirect effect) and/or some of these firms are able to finance all of 
their positive net value projects with the help of external financing (direct effect). 
The non-monotonic relationship of the theoretical literature relies partially on the 
existence of the totally unconstrained firms. Contrary to the simulated sample, where 
unconstrained firms by definition have zero sensitivity, in real world none of the firms 
operates in perfect market conditions. The non-monotonic relationship derived in this paper 
is independent of the presence of the totally unconstrained firms. We provide both 
theoretical and empirical evidence for the non-monotonic investment-cash flow sensitivity 
from a new perspective. The estimated cash flow sensitivity of investment led us to conclude 
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Firm-years financed by internal capital (I.) 
1. (10%)  ≥ 0  ≥ 0  ≤ 0  ≤  0 
2. (19%)  <  0  -  ≤ 0   
       
Firm-years financed by short-term external capital (II.) 
1. (8%)  ≥ 0  <  0  < 0  - 
2. (24%)  ≥ 0  ≥ 0  ≤  0  >  0 
3. (3%)  <  0  -  >  0  - 
       
Firm-years financed by long-term external capital (III.) 
1. (20%)  ≥ 0  <  0  ≥ 0  - 
2. (16%)  ≥ 0  ≥ 0  >  0  - 
 
 
Table 2.  
Firms’ classification 
Final outcome  No. of observation 
( firm-years)  No. of firms  % of firms 
Absolutely constrained firms (I.) 
 6,709  1,112  21% 
Partially constrained firms (II.) 
 17,266  2,767  54% 
Least constrained firms (III.) 





Table 3.  
Summary statistics 
Variables Mean  Median  Std.  Dev. 
P-value 
  .) . ( II I =
P-value 
.) . ( III II =  
1. Firms’ size (logarithm of total assets)  0.00 0.00 
.  I 10.745 10.705 1.732    
. II   11.198 11.041 1.725    
. III   11.758 11.584  1.870    
2.  Firms’ total investment to beginning of year total assets 0.00  0.00 
.  I 0.078 0.048  0.187    
. II   0.130 0.099  0.179    
. III   0.167 0.127  0.188    
3. Sales’ growth     0.00  0.00 
.  I
. II
0.036 0.029  0.202    
  0.072 0.060  0.176    
. III   0.099 0.081  0.180    
4. Cash flow to the beginning of year total assets 0.00  0.00 
.  I
. II
0.088 0.079  0.077    
  0.100 0.090  0.072    
. III   0.114 0.102  0.075    
5. Obtained long-term credit to the beginning of period total 
assets  0.00 0.00 
.  I
. II
-0.007 0.00  0.044    
  - 0.001  0.00  0.058    
. III   0.024 0.001  0.074    
6. Obtained short-term credit to the beginning of period  total 
assets  0.00 0.23 
.  I
. II
-0.003 0.00  0.064    
  0.016 0.002  0.082    
. III   0.015 0.000  0.072    
7. Leverage (total debt to total assets)    0.00  0.00 
.  I
. II
0.143 0.080  0.165    
  0.230 0.212  0.163    
. III   0.257 0.245  0.186    
8. Cost of credit (interest payments to total debt)   0.00  0.00 
.  I
. II
0.150 0.091  0.161    
  0.116 0.076  0.125    
. III   0.098 0.065  0.115    
Note: Firms’ total investment is calculated as investment in fixed and current assets plus 
depreciation. Cash flow is defined as profit for the period plus depreciation. Sales growth is 
calculated as the first difference of the logarithm of annual sales. The obtained credits are 
calculated as the yearly change of the financial debt. Interest payments include all interest 
paid and similar charges in the given year. We assign the letter   for absolutely constrained 
firms,   for partially constrained firms and   for the least constrained firms. We test the 
hypothesis that the mean value of variables of one group is not significantly different across 
firm groups using a t-test. P values of t-test are presented in the last two columns. 
. I
. II . III
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Table 4.  
Summary statistics of variables used in regressions 
  No. of 
Obs.  Mean Med. Stand.
Dev.  Min. Max. 













  31,499 0.10 0.09 0.07 -0.17 0.45 
t i Sales , log ∆   25,129 0.07 0.06 0.18 -0.82 1.29 
 
( ) 1 , 1 , log 8 . 0 log − − × − t i t i Sales Assets
 
25,129 2.01 1.95 0.77 -1.48 8.35 
term Correction Er _ .   25,129 0.011  0.011  0.002  0.010  0.029 













  6,709 0.09  0.08  0.08  -0.16  0.45 
t i Sales , log ∆   6,709 0.04  0.03  0.20  -0.82  1.27 
 
( ) 1 , 1 , log 8 . 0 log − − × − t i t i Sales Assets
 
5,278 1.81 1.76  0.76  -1.48  6.33 
term Correction Er _ .   5,278 0.011  0.011  0.002  0.010  0.029 













  17,266 0.10 0.09 0.07 -0.17 0.45 
t i Sales , log ∆   17,266 0.07 0.06 0.18 -0.81 1.29 
 
( ) 1 , 1 , log 8 . 0 log − − × − t i t i Sales Assets
 
13,878  1.977 1.939 0.717 -0.433 7.386 
term Correction Er _ .   13,878  0.011 0.011 0.002 0.010 0.023 













  7,524 0.11  0.10  0.08  -0.17  0.45 
t i Sales , log ∆   7,524 0.10  0.08  0.18  -0.81  1.26 
 
( ) 1 , 1 , log 8 . 0 log − − × − t i t i Sales Assets
 
5,97  2.24 2.16 0.85 -0.34 8.35 
term Correction Er _ .   5,973  0.012 0.011 0.002 0.010 0.024 
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Inv  is the total investment of the firm   at time  i t, measured as the change in fixed 
and non-cash current assets plus depreciation divided by the beginning of period total assets. 
 denotes the current cash flow calculated as the profit for the period (profit after tax plus 
extraordinary profit)  plus depreciation and 
t i CF ,
t i, Sales log ∆  is the first difference of the 
logarithm of sales.   and   refer to the first lag of the  logarithm of total 
assets and sales. The  is the first lagged estimated residuals of the 
equation: 
1 , log − t i Assets
Er.
log
1 , log − t i Sales
term _
t i i ,
Correction
t i Sales , t i TA , log ε γ β α + + + = , where log  and log  refer to the 
logarithm of total assets and sales. 
t i, TA t i Sales ,
i γ  and  t i, ε  represent the firm fixed effects and a random 
disturbance, respectively. 
Table 5. 























































N  5,266 13,860 5,962 








AR(1) – z statistic -2.56  -2.55  -4.44 
(prob.) (  0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00) 
AR(2) – z statistic  -0.78  -0.72  0.78 
(prob.) (0.44)  (0.47)  (0.43) 
 
Note: We assign the letter   for absolutely constrained firms,   for partially constrained 
firms and   for the least constrained firms. Two-step system GMM estimates are 
presented with finite-sample correction to the two-step covariance matrix (robust standard 










 is the total investment of the firm i at time t, measured as the change in 
fixed and non-cash current assets plus depreciation divided by the beginning of period total 
assets.   denotes the current cash flow calculated as the profit for the period (profit after 
tax plus extraordinary profit)  plus depreciation and 
t i CF ,
t i, Sales log ∆  is the first difference of the 
logarithm of sales.   and   refer to the first lag of the  logarithm of 
total assets and sales. All regressions include a set of industry, time and country dummies 
(not reported). Instruments are the 3
1 , log − t i Assets 1 , log − t i Sales
rt lags of the dependent and independent variables. The 
2nd la g  of the  e r r or c or r e c t ion t erm  is  u s ed  as  a n in s t rum e nt  onl y  in  t he le v el  e qu a t ion. 
Industry and time dummies are also taken as strictly exogenous instruments for the level 
equation. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance 






















t i Sales , log
term Correction _
 
Table 6.  
Robustness: alternative error correction term specification 
Dependent variable: 


































N  5,266 13,860 5,962 








AR(1) – z statistic  -2.64 -2.09 -2.79 
(prob.)  ( 0.00)  (0.04)  (0.01) 
AR(2) – z statistic  -0.95 -0.49 -0.75 
(prob.)  (0.34) (0.63) (0.46) 
 
Note: We assign the letter   for absolutely constrained firms,   for partially constrained 
firms and   for the least constrained firms. Two-step system GMM estimates are 
presented with finite-sample correction to the two-step covariance matrix (robust standard 









Inv  is the total investment of the firm   at time  i t, measured as the change in 
fixed and non-cash current assets plus depreciation divided by the beginning of period total 
assets.   denotes the current cash flow calculated as the profit for the period (profit after 
tax plus extraordinary profit)  plus depreciation and 
t i CF ,
t i, Sales log ∆  is the first difference of the 
logarithm of sales. The  is the first lagged estimated residuals of the 
equation: 
term Correction Er _ .
t i i t i Sales , , log t i, TA log ε γ β α + + + = , where log  and log  refer to the 
logarithm of total assets and sales. 
t i TA , t i Sales ,
i γ  and  t i, ε  represent the firm fixed effects and a random 
disturbance, respectively. All regressions include a set of industry, time and country 
dummies (not reported). Instruments are the 3rt lags of the dependent and independent 
variables. The 2nd lag of the error correction term is used as an instrument only in the level 
equation. Industry and time dummies are also taken as strictly exogenous instruments for 
the level equation.  t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%. 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Figure 1.  











No. of firms 
1995-2004 
Size 
No. of firm-years 
1995-2004 
1.  Non-financial sectors, excluding 
agriculture, forestry, fishing and 
mining, government sectors and 
undetermined sectors 
(not in A, B, C , J, L, M, N, O, P, Q) 7 
15,145 69,136 
2.  Exclusion of firms with Inactive 
legal status8  14,852  67,865     
3.  Firms with consistent balance 
sheet at 5% (i.e. 5% deviation is 
allowed) and cash and cash 
equivalent≤other current assets 
(when available) 
14,227 65,434 
4.  Trimming of the variables of main 
interest: logarithm of total assets, 
total assets growth, sales growth, 
total investment, cash flow to 
beginning of period total assets 
and short/long term borrowings 
14,152 61,799 
5.  Exclusion of observations with 
missing growth variables (total 
assets and sales growth)-first year 
of each firm plus observations 
following a year gap 
11,114 43,148 
6.  Minimum of three consecutive 





                                                        
7 A-Agriculture and related service activities, B-Fishing, operation of fish hatcheries and fish farms, C-Mining 
and quarrying, J-Financial intermediation, L-Public administration and defence, compulsory social security, 
M-Education, N-Health and social work, O-Other community, social and personal service activities, P-Private 
households with employed persons, Q- Extra-territorial organisations and bodies 
8 *Selected firms with legal status defined as Active, Active (default of payments), Active (receivership) or not 
available. Excluded those under legal status defined as Bankruptcy, Dissolved, Dissolved (demerger), 
Dissolved (merger), In liquidation, Inactive (no precision), Credito incobrable, Naar buitenland, Not 
classified, Not defined, Removed. 
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Table A2.  
Country coverage 
    Size 
No. of observations 
Percentage from 
total 
1.  Austria  75 0% 
2.  Belgium  991 3% 
3.  Finland  6,893 22% 
4.  France  5,583 18% 
5.  Germany  1,661 5% 
6.  Italy  4,055 13% 
7.  Luxemburg  21 0% 
8.  Netherlands  8,616 27% 
9.  Portugal  621 2% 
10.  Spain  2,983 9% 
 
Table A3. 
 Observations per years 
    Size 
No. of observations 
1.  1995  1,036 
2.  1996  1,772 
3.  1997  2,482 
4.  1998  3,006 
5.  1999  3,693 
6.  2000  4,074 
7.  2001  4,602 
8.  2002  4,410 
 9.  2003  3,470 
10.  2004  2,954 
 
Table A4. 








1.  Listed  6,993  22% 






 Industry distribution. 
 
  Size 
No. of observations 
Percentage from 
total 
1.  Construction  2,475 8% 
2.  Manufacturing  8,817 28% 
3.  Utilities  2,343 7% 
4.  Wholesale and retail sales   7,326 23% 
5.  Transport and communication  1,947 6% 
6.   Services (business activities, hotels 





Discussion Papers published since 1999  
 
2004 
Gergely CSORBA: Screening Contracts in the Presence of Positive Net-work Effects MT–DP. 
2004/14 
K. BOGNÁR – L. SMITH: We Can’t Argue Forever MT–DP. 2004/15 
JUHÁSZ A. – SERES A. – STAUDER M.: A kereskedelmi koncentráció módszertana MT–
DP. 2004/16 
Júlia LENDVAI:  Inflation Inertia and Monetary Policy Shocks MT–DP. 2004/17 
A. FREDERIKSEN –E. TAKÁTS: Optimal Incentive Mix of Performance Pay and Efficiency 
Wage MT–DP. 2004/18 
Péter KONDOR: The More We Know, the Less We Agree: Public Announcements and 
Higher-Order Expectations. MT–DP. 2004/19 
BARANYI B. –BALCSÓK I.: Határmenti együttműködés és a foglalkoztatás – kelet-
magyarországi helyzetkép. MT–DP. 2004/20 
L.Á. KÓCZY – L. LAUWERS: The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension. 
MT–DP. 2004/21 
Miklós KOREN: The Law of Two Prices: Trade Costs and Relative Price Variability MT–DP. 
2004/22 
A. AMBRUS – R. ARGENZIANO: Network Markets and Consumer Coordination. MT–DP. 
2004/23 
LŐCSEI Hajnalka: A vidéki városi agglomerációk fejlődési pályája. MT–DP. 2004/24 
J.D.BROWN – J.S. EARLE – Á. TELEGDY: Does Privatization Raise Productivity?. MT–DP. 
2004/25 
HÁRS Ágnes: A magyar munkaerő-migráció regionális sajátosságairól MT–DP. 2004/26 
 
2005 
GÁCS János: A lisszaboni folyamat: rejtélyek, elméleti problémák és gyakorlati nehézségek. 
MT–DP. 2005/1 
PÉTERI Gábor: Igazodás a piacgazdaság szabályaihoz és megfelelés a helyi elvárásoknak – A 
városi polgármesterek értékrendje, 2004. MT–DP. 2005/2 
SZALAI Ákos: Adóverseny az iparűzési adóban – Az 5000 fő fölötti települések adópolitikája 
a 2000-es években. MT–DP. 2005/3 
Gábor BÉKÉS – Balázs MURAKÖZY: Firm Behaviour and Public Infrastructure: The Case of 
Hungary. MT–DP. 2005/4 
Gusztav NEMES: The Politics of Rural Development in Europe. MT–DP. 2005/5 
Gusztav NEMES: Integrated Rural Development – the Concept and Its Operation. MT–DP. 
2005/6 
JUHÁSZ Anikó –SERES Antal –STAUDER Márta: A kereskedelmi koncentráció tendenciái 
MT–DP. 2005/7 
Hajnalka TARJÁNI: Estimating some Labour Market Implications of Skill Biased 
Technology Change and imports in Hungary. MT–DP. 2005/8 
L. HALPERN – M.KOREN.- Á. SZEIDL: Import and Productivity. MT–DP. 2005/9 
Szabolcs LŐRINCZ: Persistence Effects in a Dynamic Discrete Choice Model – Application to 
Low-End Computer Servers. MT-DP. 2005/10 
Péter VIDA: A Detail-free Mediator and the 3 Player Case. MT-DP. 2005/11 




Viktória KOCSIS: Network Asymmetries and Access Pricing in Cellular Telecommunications. 
MT-DP. 2005/13 
István KÓNYA: Economic Development, Exchange Rates, and the Structure of Trade. MT-
DP. 2005/14 
Gábor G. SZABÓ – Krisztina BÁRDOS: Vertical Coordination by Contracts in Agribusiness: 
An Empirical Research in the Hungarian Dairy Sector MT-DP. 2005/15 
Attila AMBRUS: Theories of Coalitional Rationality. MT-DP. 2005/16 
Jin-Chuan DUAN – András FÜLÖP: Estimating the Structural Credit Risk Model When 
Equity Prices Are Contaminated by Trading Noises. MT-DP. 2005/17 
Lawrence UREN – Gábor VIRÁG: Wage Inequality in a Burdett-Mortensen World. MT-DP. 
2005/18 
Berthold HERRENDORF – Ákos VALENTINYI: Which Sectors Make the Poor Countries so 
Unproductive? MT-DP. 2005/19 
János GÁCS: The Macroeconomic Conditions of EU-inspired Employment Policies. MT-DP. 
2005/20 
CSATÓ Katalin: Egy fiziokrata: Paul-Pierre Le Mercier de la Rivière. MT-DP. 2005/21 
 
2006 
Krisztina MOLNÁR – Sergio SANTORO: Optimal Monetary Policy When Agents Are 
Learning. MT-DP. 2006/1 
András SIMONOVITS: Social Security Reform in the US: Lessons from Hungary. MT-DP. 
2006/2 
Iván MAJOR: Why do (or do not) banks share customer information?. A comparison of 
mature private credit markets and markets in transition. MT-DP. 2006/3 
Mária LACKÓ: Tax Rates with Corruption: Labour-market Effects. Empirical Cross-country 
Comparisons on OECD Countries. MT-DP. 2006/4 
György MOLNÁR – Zsuzsa KAPITÁNY: Mobility, Uncertainty and Subjective Well-being in 
Hungary. MT-DP. 2006/5 
Discussion Papers are available at the website of Institute of Economics Hungarian Academy 
of Sciences: http://econ.core.hu 